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Abstract 
This paper studies the responses of residential property and equity prices, 
inflation and economic activity to monetary policy shocks in 17 countries, 
using data spanning 1986-2006. We estimate VARs for individual economies 
and panel VARs in which we distinguish between groups of countries on the 
basis of the characteristics of their financial systems. The results suggest that 
using monetary policy to offset asset price movements in order to guard 
against financial instability may have large effects on economic activity. 
Furthermore, while financial structure influences the impact of policy on asset 
prices, its importance appears limited. 
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1. Introduction 
There is much agreement that asset prices, in particular residential property prices, provide a 
crucial link through which adverse macroeconomic developments can cause financial 
instability.1 Episodes of asset price “booms” are seen as raising the risk of a sharp correction 
of prices, which could have immediate repercussions on the stability of financial institutions. 
Indeed, many observers have argued that property-price collapses have historically played 
an important role in episodes of financial instability at the level of individual financial 
institutions and the macro economy (e.g. Ahearne et al. 2005, Goodhart and Hofmann 2007a). 
Not surprisingly, this view has led to calls for central banks to react to movements in asset 
prices “over and beyond” what such changes imply for the path of aggregate demand and 
inflation (Borio and Lowe 2002, Cecchetti et al. 2000).  Proponents of this policy emphasise 
that episodes of financial instability could depress inflation and economic activity below 
their desired levels. Consequently, they argue, central banks that seek to stabilise the 
economy over a sufficiently long time horizon may need to react to current asset price 
movements (Bean 2004, Ahearne et al. 2005).  Importantly, they do not argue that asset prices 
should be targeted, only that central banks should be willing to tighten policy at the margin 
in order to slow down increases in asset prices that are viewed as being excessively rapid in 
order to reduce the likelihood of a future crash that could trigger financial instability and 
adverse macroeconomic outcomes. 
While seemingly attractive, this proposed policy has implications for central banks' 
understanding of economic developments and for the effectiveness of monetary policy (Bean 
2004, Bernanke 2002, Kohn 2006). First, central banks must be able to identify in real time 
whether asset prices are moving too fast or are out of line with fundamentals. Second, 
changes in policy-controlled interest rates must have stable and predictable effects on asset 
prices. Third, the effects of monetary policy on different asset prices, such as residential 
property and equity prices, must be about as rapid, since stabilising one may otherwise lead 
to greater volatility of the other. Needless to say, if these criteria are not satisfied 
simultaneously, any attempts by central banks to offset asset price movements may simply 
                                                 
1  The chapters in Hunter et al. (2003) provide an excellent overview of the interlinkages between 
monetary policy, asset prices and financial stability.  
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raise macroeconomic volatility, potentially increasing the risk of financial instability 
developing. Fourth, the size of interest rate movements required to mitigate asset price 
swings must not be so large as to cause economic activity and, in particular, inflation to 
deviate substantially from their desired levels since, if this were to be the case, the resulting 
macroeconomic cycles could lead the public to question the central bank’s commitment to 
price stability. Fifth, the effects of monetary policy on asset prices must be felt sufficiently 
rapidly so that a tightening of policy impacts on asset prices before any bubble would burst 
on its own (since policy should then presumably be relaxed to offset the macro economic 
effects of the collapse of the bubble).2 
Of course, it is by no means clear that central banks are better able to judge the appropriate 
level of asset prices and the risk of future sharp price declines than agents transacting in 
these markets. It is equally unclear whether monetary policy has predictable effects on asset 
prices and, if so, whether these effects occur at about the same time horizons for different 
asset prices, whether they are large relative to the effects of monetary policy on inflation and 
economic activity and whether they occur faster. Thus, it is not clear that any of the five 
criteria are satisfied. In this paper we attempt to shed light on these issues by exploring the 
responses of residential property and equity prices, inflation and output growth to monetary 
policy shocks for a panel of 17 OECD countries using quarterly data for the period 1986-2006.  
The analysis proceeds in three steps. Following Iacoviello (2002) and Giuliodori (2005), we 
first estimate vector autoregressive models (VARs) for individual countries and study the 
impact of monetary policy on the economy.3 Not surprisingly, the resulting estimates are 
imprecise, leaving considerable uncertainty about the quantitative effect of changes in 
interest rates on asset prices relative to their impact on economic activity and inflation, as 
would seem to be an important precondition for monetary policy to be used to mitigate asset 
price movements. To raise the precision of the estimates, we thus follow Goodhart and 
                                                 
2  Bean (2004) and Kohn (2006) discuss the implications of lags for the use of monetary policy in the 
face of asset price bubbles. 
3  Sutton (2002) and Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) also estimate VARs incorporating residential 
property prices for a range of countries. The focus of their studies, however, is on which factors 
explain movements in residential property prices and not on whether monetary policy is able to 
stabilize asset price movements. 
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Hofmann (2007b) and estimate a panel VAR incorporating real residential property and real 
equity prices. Our results show that while monetary policy does have important effects on 
asset prices, those effects are not particularly large relative to those it has on inflation and 
output. This suggests that attempts to stabilise asset prices by using interest rate policy are 
likely to induce pronounced macroeconomic fluctuations. 
However, while the panel estimates confirm that monetary policy has predictable effects on 
residential property prices, by construction these estimates disregard all country specific 
information. Since a number of authors have asserted that the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy depends on the institutional characteristics of the financial system, we go on 
to split the sample of countries into two groups depending on their financial structure.4 We 
then estimate a panel VAR for each group and explore whether the impact of monetary 
policy on asset prices, inflation and output differs between the two groups. We use several 
measures proposed in the literature to capture differences in financial structure, including 
the importance of floating rate lending; whether mortgage equity withdrawal is possible; the 
loan-to-value ratio for new mortgages; the mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio in the economy; the 
method used to value property; whether mortgages are securitised; and the share of owner 
occupied dwellings. To preview briefly the results, we find that the financial structure does 
condition the responses of asset prices to monetary policy but also that the differences 
between country groups are less important than commonly thought.5 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section contains a discussion of the data and 
Section 3 presents the results for the VARs estimated for individual countries. In Section 4 
we first briefly discuss panel VARs before discussing the estimates. Section 5 focuses on the 
importance of financial structure and provides panel-VAR estimates when the countries are 
divided into two groups on the basis of financial structure. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
                                                 
4  The importance of financial structure of the economy is emphasized by so many authors that it is 
impossible to provide a full overview here. See, among others, Maclennan et al. (1998), Giuliodori 
(2005), Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004), CGFS (2006) and Calza et al. (2007).  
5  See Maclennan et al. (1998) for a dissenting opinion. 
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2. Data 
The econometric analysis below is conducted on quarterly data on equity and residential 
property prices, consumer price indices (CPIs), real gross domestic product (GDP) and 
interest rates.6 Much of the interest in the behaviour and determination of asset prices stems 
from their role in episodes of financial instability. Since there is a natural tendency to focus 
on data from countries that have experienced pronounced asset-price swings, there is a risk 
of sample selection bias which can be mitigated by using data from a broad cross-section of 
countries. We therefore study 17 countries for which we could obtain both equity and 
residential property price data: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
UK and the US.  
The sample starts in 1986 in order to avoid the more turbulent, higher inflation period that 
ended in the first half of the 1980. Moreover, and as noted by Ahearne et al. (2005) and 
Girouard and Blöndal (2001), many countries deregulated their mortgage markets during the 
early to mid-1980s, suggesting that estimates relying on older data are unlikely to be 
representative for modern economies. The data set ends in 2006. Goodhart and Hofmann 
(2007b) in their panel VAR analysis also study, as a part of their robustness analysis, a sub-
sample spanning these years and find that this later period indeed differs from the earlier 
part of their sample (although their data definitions are somewhat different). 
Residential property prices are from the data base of the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS). Quarterly data over the whole sample period are available for Australia, Canada, 
Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the US. 7 For, 
Belgium we link an older series for small and medium-sized houses to the residential 
property price series for all dwellings from 1988 on. For Spain we link the residential 
property prices of existing dwellings with those of owner-occupied homes in 2005. For 
Ireland and Norway we interpolate annual data with the Chow-Lin (1971) procedure, using 
a rent index and an index of residential construction cost as reference series, and link the 
                                                 
6  All results are obtained with the software RATS 7.0. 
7  For Australia, missing values for the first two quarters of 1986 were generated using the growth of 
residential construction cost. 
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resulting series to the BIS quarterly data that start in 1988 and 1991, respectively.8 The same 
interpolation procedure is applied to annual property price data for Germany and Italy.9 For 
Japan the semi-annual series on residential land prices is interpolated.10   
Figure 1 shows the resulting residential property price series. 11  Interestingly, many 
economies experienced a sharp rise in residential property prices in the second half of the 
1980s, in many cases associated with liberalisation and deregulation of the housing finance 
sector. Residential property prices were subsequently weak or fell in the 1990s, following the 
US recession in 1990-1991 and the episode of high interest rates in many European countries 
after the turmoil in the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) in 1992-93 which was 
triggered by the adoption of tight monetary policy in Germany to offset the aggregate 
demand effects of German Reunification. 
The figure indicates that following the collapse of the “bubble economy” in Japan around 
1990, residential property prices fell continuously until the end of the sample. In Germany 
residential property prices started falling in 1994 and declined until 2006, vividly indicating 
the depth of the “German crisis.”  
It should be emphasised from the outset that data on residential property prices are not 
necessarily comparable across countries. The main differences concern the type of housing 
that is included (single family houses, flats or all types), whether existing dwellings or new 
dwellings are considered, whether prices are per dwelling or per square meter, and the 
region (urban, non-urban or both) where the data is collected. While price developments 
vary between types of housing reflecting supply and demand conditions in different market 
segments, the most noticeable differences arise with respect to the area where the data come 
from. Property price booms generally occur in metropolitan areas, and are often less 
pronounced if data for the whole country are considered. The impact of this, however, is 
                                                 
8  Annual data for Norway are from Eitrheim and Erlandsen (2004). 
9  Annual property price data for Italy are taken from Cannari et al. (2006). 
10  In Japan, a market for old homes practically does not exist and houses are normally torn down 
after a few decades. As a consequence, land prices determine the value of housing, see the 
Economist (2008). 
11  We note that despite the difference in data sources, the patterns are comparable to those reported 
in Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) and Ahearne et al. (2005). 
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difficult to assess since only few countries have series covering these different categories. As 
an example, Figure 2 shows the annual increase in nominal UK residential property prices 
for the whole country and the greater London area. While the greater-London prices seem 
more volatile, both series share the same main features (their correlation is 0.82). The left 
hand panel shows the annual increase in prices for single-family houses and flats in 
Switzerland. Again, the year-to-year changes differ somewhat but generally convey the same 
information (the correlation is 0.86). For our study we use whenever possible the broadest 
residential property price index available in order not to capture regional booms. 
Nevertheless, great care needs to be exercised when comparing property-price developments 
across countries.  
Turning to the sources of the other data, the CPI (all items) and share price indices (all 
shares) are from the OECD Main Economic Indicators (MEI) data base. Real GDP data were 
taken from the BIS data base and supplemented with data from the International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) data base of the IMF. 12  For Ireland annual GDP data before 1997 were 
interpolated with the Chow-Lin (1971) procedure using industrial production as the 
reference series. We use a three-month interbank rate for Denmark, Switzerland, Spain, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK, a three-
month Treasury bill rate for Belgium, Sweden and the US, and a three-month commercial 
paper rate for Australia, Canada and Japan.13 All interest rates are from the OECD's MEI. For 
Finland and Denmark missing data for 1986 were replaced with data from the IFS (call 
money rate). For the euro-area countries we use the three-month EURIBOR rate after 1998. 
Except for interest rates and equity prices all data are seasonally adjusted.  
3. VARs for individual economies 
We start by estimating VAR models for individual countries, following the approach taken 
by Giuliodori (2005), Iacoviello (2002) and Neri (2004). We include five variables: the CPI (p), 
real GDP (y), the three-month interest rate (i), real residential property prices (rhp) and real 
                                                 
12  For the Netherlands the IFS data apparently contain an error in 1998. We therefore used real GDP 
from the MEI data base. 
13  To eliminate a large spike during the ERM crisis we regressed the three-month interest rate for 
Ireland on a dummy, which is unity in 1992Q4 and zero elsewhere, before conducting the analysis.  
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equity prices (rsp), with the real variables being obtained using the CPI. Except for the 
interest rate, all variables are in logarithms. Before we turn to the econometric analysis it is 
useful to investigate the time-series characteristics of the data. Since we take a panel 
approach below, we perform panel unit root tests, using the test statistics suggested by 
Pedroni (1999).14 The results in Table 1 indicate that all variables are nonstationary in levels, 
but stationary in first differences.  
Next we test for cointegration between the variables.15 When using a common lag length of 
four for all countries, the existence of at least one cointegrating vector could not be rejected 
except in Japan, Sweden and the US. When using fewer lags, however, also for these 
countries the existence of cointegration could not be rejected. We therefore specify the VAR 
models in the level of the variables. Nevertheless, we neither impose the number of 
cointegrating relations on the systems nor do we attempt to impose overidentifying 
restrictions on the cointegrating vector.  
For an individual country n, n = 1, … , N, the reduced form of the VAR thus can be written as 
tntnnntn YLAY ,,, )( εμ ++= , where ),,,,( ,,,,,, tntntntntntn rsprhpiypY = , μn is a constant, An(L) is a 
matrix polynomial in the lag operator and tn,ε  is a vector of normally, identically distributed 
disturbances. For each country the number of lags included in the VAR is chosen by the 
Akaike information criterion, considering a maximum lag length of four. 
To identify the shocks, we use a Choleski decomposition, with the variables ordered as 
above, which is standard in the monetary transmission literature (see Christiano et al. 1999). 
This triangular identification structure allows output and the price level to react only with a 
lag to monetary policy shocks, whereas property and equity prices may respond 
                                                 
14  We also studied the time series properties of the data for individual countries, which were 
generally compatible with the panel results discussed in the main text. However, given the sheer 
amount of test results, we refrain from commenting on them.  
15  Iacoviello (2002) argues that a long-run relation between GDP and real residential property prices 
should exist. 
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immediately. We thus assume that central banks react to current output growth and inflation 
when setting interest rates, but not to current property and equity prices.16  
While this last assumption may seem controversial in that few observers would doubt that 
central banks react to changes in asset prices since these influence aggregate demand and 
inflation pressures, barring exceptional circumstances one would not expect any reactions to 
be instantaneous but rather to occur if asset prices rise or fall for some time. By contrast, asset 
prices react immediately to changes in monetary policy. Thus, it seems sensible to attribute 
the contemporaneous correlation between interest rates and asset prices to reactions by the 
latter to the former rather than conversely. We have explored whether the results are 
sensitive to this assumption. Not surprisingly, for equity prices the ordering does matter but 
for residential property prices it does not. However, the alternative assumption that the 
contemporaneous correlation between innovations in interest rates and equity prices is due 
solely to reactions by monetary policy is not only implausible for the reasons mentioned, but 
also leads to counterintuitive results. For instance, equity prices start to increase after a 
contractionary monetary policy shock.17 It therefore seems appropriate to order the interest 
rate before the asset prices in the system.  
Figure 3 shows the bootstrapped impulse responses to a monetary policy shock of 25 basis 
points in the single-country VARs.18 Since these models involve the estimation of a large 
number of parameters, impulse responses are imprecisely estimated. Many analysts 
therefore use plus/minus one standard-error (i.e., 68%) confidence bands. We therefore do so 
too. However, the impulse responses arising from the panel VARs are more precisely 
estimated since the data are pooled. To take that into account when conducting inference, we 
use plus/minus two standard-error (i.e., 95%) confidence bands in this case. In order to 
permit comparison with the single country VARs, we show plus/minus one and plus/minus 
two standard-error wide bootstrapped confidence bands in all graphs. Given the large 
                                                 
16  To identify the monetary policy shock it is sufficient to determine the position of the monetary 
policy instrument; the ordering of the variables in the groups before and after the interest rate does 
not matter. 
17  This is also inconsistent with results obtained with structural identification assumptions relying on 
the long-run effects of monetary policy, see Lastrapes (1998). 
18  The bootstrapped confidence bounds are obtained using the methodology proposed by Sims and 
Zha (1999) and are based on 1000 replications. 
 9
number of impulse responses generated by the estimation process, we focus on the general 
features of the results.  
As a preliminary, note that the impulse responses are frequently statistically insignificant 
even when the 68% confidence bands are used. After a monetary policy shock the CPI falls, 
though in most countries it takes about 15 to 20 quarters before the maximum effect is felt. 
Nevertheless, in some countries the CPI rises in the short run, indicating the presence of a 
“price puzzle.”19 Because of the wide confidence bands, however, this effect is significant 
only in Australia, Switzerland and the UK. Real GDP declines after a monetary policy shock 
in all countries, and significantly so in about half of them. It is notable that GDP reacts much 
faster than the CPI to a monetary policy shock.  
Of particular interest is the reaction of asset prices. Except for Germany and Spain, 
residential property prices fall in reaction to monetary policy shocks. Furthermore, there 
appear to be interesting differences across countries: the fall of residential property prices is 
significantly different from zero even at the 95% level in Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. Moreover, while in some countries, 
(including Finland, the UK and the US) residential property prices respond immediately to a 
monetary policy shock, in others, (e.g., Belgium or Spain), the responses are much slower 
and more persistent. However, the confidence bands are wide and it is hard to tell whether 
the responses differ systematically across countries. For equity prices the reaction to 
monetary policy shocks is generally negative and significant on impact but typically becomes 
insignificant after two quarters. 
Since the results for the single-country VARs are inconclusive and frequently insignificant, 
we go on to estimate a panel VAR (PVAR) under the assumption that pooling the data is 
likely to sharpen the estimates.  
4. Panel VARs 
There is a large literature on the estimation of panel regressions and the inconsistency that 
can arise in that context. Much of that literature deals with the bias of the fixed effects 
                                                 
19  The price puzzle arises because central banks change interest rates in response to predicted future 
changes in inflation, that is, information that the econometrician does not incorporate in the 
analysis. See Walsh (Chapter 1, 2003) for a discussion. 
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estimator in dynamic homogeneous panels that results from the inclusion of lagged 
endogenous variables (Holtz-Eakin et al. 1988). This bias is particularly severe if the time 
dimension is small but can be overcome by using GMM or instrumental variables estimators. 
Since we are in the fortunate position of having a rather long sample period, we need not be 
overly concerned about this source of bias. 
However, our main interest in this paper concerns the dynamic effect of monetary policy in a 
group of countries that have widely different financial structures. Unfortunately, it is well 
known that the standard fixed effects estimator is inconsistent in dynamic panels even if the 
time dimension is large if the coefficients on the lagged endogenous variables differ across 
groups, which is likely in our case. The reason is that restricting the slope coefficients to be 
the same across groups induces serial correlation in the residuals when the regressors are 
autocorrelated. This serial correlation does not vanish when instrumental variable estimation 
is applied (see Pesaran and Smith 1995). We therefore follow Pesaran and Smith's 
recommendation and estimate the PVAR by the mean group estimator.20 This estimator 
averages the coefficients across groups and provides a consistent estimate of the average 
effects. As we found evidence of fixed effects in the GDP and equity-price equations, we 
estimate the VAR with country-specific intercepts.  
The panel VAR thus can be written as tntnnntn YLAY ,1,, )( εμ ++= − , where tnY ,  is a 1×N  
vector containing the observations for the N countries, n = 1, …  N; μn is a country-specific 
intercept and An(L) is a lag polynomial with the VAR coefficients. The disturbances, tn,ε , 
have zero means and a country-specific variance, 2nσ . We assume that the coefficients in 
An(L) vary randomly across countries, i.e., that the typical element p j,i,na  in An(L) can be 
written as p j,i,n
p
j,i
p
j,i,n aa η+= , where n is the country index, p = 1, …, P, the lag order of the 
VAR and i, j = 1,  … K the number of variables in the VAR.  
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses to monetary policy shocks as implied by the panel 
regression. Not surprisingly, the large increase in information that comes from using the 
                                                 
20  The persistence is indeed larger if the PVAR is estimated by conventional fixed effects. 
Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008b) provide a discussion of this issue. 
 11
panel approach generates impulse responses that typically are significantly different from 
zero at the 95% level. 
Again, we consider the responses to a 25 basis point increase in the interest rate. After a 
monetary policy shock the price level takes six quarters before it starts to fall, with the effect 
becoming significant only after about two years. This slow response may be a consequence of 
some countries showing a “price puzzle” in their reaction to a monetary policy shock.21 
Furthermore, the results indicate that output falls for about six quarters in response to the 
monetary policy shock before recovering slowly. Residential property prices reach their 
trough somewhat earlier after three quarters but take even longer to recover. By contrast, 
equity prices, which are eminently forward-looking variables, fall immediately following the 
increase in interest rates and have returned to the original level by the time output and 
property prices have returned about half way to their initial levels. 
These findings warrant several comments. First, the reactions of prices and output to the 
shocks are similar to those found in the literature based on single-country studies (see, e.g. 
Christiano et al. (1999) for the US and the VAR studies in Angeloni et al. (2003) for the euro 
area). Second, the responses of residential property prices lead those of real GDP by about 
three quarters. This suggests that changes in property prices influence GDP via their effects 
on wealth and consumption demand. Third, the width of the confidence bands indicates that 
the responses of residential property prices are, statistically, about as well defined as the 
impact on real economic activity. Fourth and most importantly, the point estimate shows 
that after about one year residential property prices have fallen about three times as much as 
the level of real GDP, that is, by 0.375% rather than by 0.125%. Taken at face value, this three-
to-one estimate suggests that while monetary policy could in principle be used to offset 
swings in residential property prices that are seen as causing a threat to financial stability, it 
would induce potentially large swings in real economic activity: To offset a 15% rise in 
residential property prices, which is not an unusually large increase by the standards of 
many recent property price booms, the central bank must be willing to depress real GDP by 
                                                 
21  While our results do not indicate the presence of a price puzzle, we nevertheless believe that the 
estimates underpredict the impact of monetary policy on the level of prices since we do not include 
indicators of future inflation in our VAR system. 
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5%, a substantial amount.22 Moreover, while the impact of monetary policy shocks on equity 
prices is about as large as the peak effect on residential property prices, the marked 
difference in timing implies that monetary policy cannot be used to target or influence both. 
Overall, the results in this section suggest that gearing monetary policy to asset prices is 
likely to generate pronounced swings in economic activity and to stabilise some asset prices 
at the costs of inducing more instability in others. 
5. How important is financial structure? 
One problem with the panel VAR estimates is that they mask any potential heterogeneity 
across the 17 countries in our sample. This is unfortunate since many authors have argued 
that the impact of monetary policy on the economy varies across countries depending on the 
financial structure of the economy (Cecchetti 1999, Ehrmann et al. 2003, Giuliodori 2005). 
Moreover, it is well documented that the financial structure differs significantly between the 
countries we consider (Maclennan et al. 1998; Calza et al. 2007). However, little quantitative 
evidence on the importance of these characteristics has been presented in the literature.23 One 
problem with doing so is the nature of the available data. Institutional characteristics change 
little over time, so that time series analysis with such data is precluded. Moreover, while 
there are several characteristics that might influence the effects of monetary policy on 
financial stability, there is no agreement on which characteristics are most important and 
how best to measure these.  
With these caveats in mind, we selected a number of potentially relevant criteria from the 
literature, divided the countries in two groups on the basis of these criteria and estimated a 
                                                 
22  See also Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008a). Proponents of using monetary policy to 
mitigate swings in asset prices, such as Borio and Lowe (2002), do not seem concerned by the 
impact of such a policy on economic activity. By contrast, opponents, such as Kohn (2006), do 
worry about the effects on output and inflation. Interestingly, experimental evidence also shows 
that interest rate policy is not effective in dealing with asset price bubbles, see Becker et al. (2007). 
23  An exception is Calza et al. (2007) who compute correlations between the peak effect of a monetary 
policy shock and mortgage market indicators. Of course, there is no lack of cross-country studies 
that find differences in monetary transmission and attribute these to differences in financial 
structure. However, the estimated impulse responses may differ for many other reasons, including 
the conduct of monetary policy and other differences in economic structure that are not taken into 
account. Here we investigate the effect of financial structure more directly.  
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panel VAR for each group in order to assess the importance of financial structure.24 We 
emphasise that in compiling information on financial structure from different sources 
comparability is a readily apparent issue. One example is the loan-to-valuation (LTV) ratio, 
where some studies quote the maximum, while others refer to the average, LTV ratio. In 
addition, a considerable judgement is required when grouping countries according to these 
criteria. Consider, for instance, the classification of countries as having fixed or flexible 
mortgage interest rates. While a majority of mortgages with an interest-rate adjustment at 
three months' notice certainly classifies as flexible, it is much more difficult to decide 
whether interest rates that are fixed between one and five years (e.g., Italy; see Calza et al. 
2007) should be regarded as fixed or flexible. Any grouping of countries is therefore 
subjective and disputable. 
We deal with this problem in two ways. First, we analyse a broad range of indicators to 
ensure that we capture as many as possible aspects of the structure of mortgage financing. 
Second, for the quantitative characteristics, such as the LTV ratio, mortgage-debt-to-GDP 
ratio and owner-occupation rate, we group the countries according to whether they are 
above or below the median value of the respective criterion. Since the data quoted in the 
literature differ with respect to the methodology used and change over time, we emphasise 
that our method is robust if the ranking of the countries is stable. 
When interpreting the results, it is important to verify that the criteria are not leading to the 
same allocation of countries to the two groups. We therefore computed the correlations 
between the different criteria and found that they are close to zero. 25  With this as a 
preliminary, we turn to a discussion of the seven characteristics in Table 2, their presumed 
influence on the effects of monetary policy shocks and the results in Figure 5 to 12. 
The first is the importance of floating rate financing. It is commonly believed that in 
economies in which mortgage rates are tied to short-term interest rates, changes in monetary 
                                                 
24  We let the lag length in the VARs be determined by the AIC. 
25  The only significant correlation, 0.65, is that between mortgage equity withdrawal and the 
mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio. The other correlation coefficients lie between -0.03 and 0.44. 
Interestingly, a low share of owner-occupied homes is correlated with a correlation coefficient of 
about 0.4 with a low LTV ratio, no securitisation and the use of historical mortgage valuation 
practices. 
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policy has relatively large effects on residential property prices, and therefore on the 
economy, since the interest rates on all loans are reset at the same time. In contrast, in the 
case of fixed rate lending, only new borrowers are affected by changes in interest rates.26 It is 
therefore sometimes argued that fixed-rate mortgages are less risky than floating-rate 
mortgages. However, an unexpected fall in the steady-state inflation rate exposes fixed-rate 
borrowers to an increase in the real interest rate. This effect may have been a factor 
contributing to the fall in residential property prices and the generally weak economic 
performance in the 1990s in Germany and Japan, both of which rely predominantly on fixed-
rate financing. 
In Figure 5 we present the results obtained when we distinguish between countries 
depending on the prevalence of fixed- versus variable-rate mortgages. As one would expect, 
the effects of monetary policy on GDP and residential property prices are large when 
variable-rate mortgages are prevalent. Surprisingly, the reaction of equity prices to monetary 
policy is almost twice as large. In addition the reaction in the fixed-rate group seems to be 
more persistent, which is compatible with the idea that in economies in which fixed-rate 
financing is important, higher short-term interest rates will only over time become 
embedded in mortgage interest rates and therefore impact on GDP and property prices with 
a delay.   
The second feature we consider is the importance of housing equity withdrawal. If 
households are able to withdraw equity, one would expect them to do so in response to 
rising residential property prices. This would boost consumption spending and aggregate 
demand, and might further increase residential property prices. The process will also work 
in reverse: a tightening of monetary policy that triggers declines in residential property 
prices is likely to have a greater impact on residential property prices and GDP than if 
mortgage equity extraction is not possible.  
Figure 6 shows that the ability to withdraw mortgage equity influences the timing, but less 
so the size, of the reactions of GDP to monetary policy shocks. In economies where equity 
withdrawal is possible, GDP shows an immediate decline after a monetary policy shock, 
                                                 
26  See Maclennan et al. (1998). Calza et al. (2007) present a model which implies that the sensitivity of 
consumption to monetary policy shocks is higher with variable-rate mortgages. 
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which is less significant and shorter-lived than the GDP decline in the other group. The 
reactions of the other variables to a monetary policy shock are essentially the same.  
A third important characteristic of the financial system is the LTV ratio. A high LTV ratio 
means that households can relatively easily obtain financing to purchase property, 
suggesting that the effects of changes in interest rates are likely to be marked. Furthermore, 
interest rate increases may be more contractionary since households have less equity and 
thus may be more prone to default in conditions of economic hardship. Figure 7 shows that 
the reaction of property prices in the high-LTV group is slightly larger but that the 
differences between both groups are negligible.  
The fourth characteristic is the mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio. Since data on the average LTV 
ratio are difficult to obtain and banks presumably apply different criteria to different 
borrowers, the ratio of mortgage debt to GDP provides an alternative measure for the 
responsiveness of the housing market to interest rate changes. Figure 8 shows that real GDP 
falls more quickly and for a longer period in reaction to monetary policy shocks in countries 
with high mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio. Contrary to our expectation, however, the response 
of residential property prices is larger in the group with the lower mortgage-debt-to GDP 
ratio.  
The fifth characteristic is the valuation method that is used in different countries. If banks 
base lending decisions on the current, as opposed to the historical, valuation level, 
households’ ability to borrow will be more sensitive to current economic conditions and 
monetary policy. Thus, Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) hypothesise that residential property 
prices fall faster and by more in economies in which properties are valued using their current 
market prices. According to Figure 9, however, there are no differences in the mean 
responses of residential property prices and GDP but the responses are more precisely 
estimated in economies in which properties are valued using their current market prices.  
The sixth characteristic we assess is whether it matters if mortgage loans are securitised. It 
has been argued that the increased reliance on capital markets for mortgage funding 
associated with securitisation implies stronger effects of monetary policy on the economy 
and on residential property prices (CGFS 2006). On the other hand, Tsatsaronis and Zhu 
(2004) conjecture that the prevalence of securitisation should reduce the sensitivity of 
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residential property prices to monetary policy shocks since it allows banks to transfer the 
credit risk associated with mortgages to the capital market. Without securitisation the risk of 
credit crunches would therefore be commensurately larger, implying that the effects of 
monetary policy may be more pronounced in economies in which mortgage loans are not 
securitised.   
Figure 10 suggests that residential property prices in countries  in which securitisation is not 
common fall by more in response to monetary policy shocks than in countries in which 
securitisation plays an important role. This may be because if banks hold mortgages on their 
balance sheets, weak residential property prices impact on their willingness to lend. By 
contrast, GDP falls by more in economies where securitisation is frequent; indicating that the 
fall in residential property prices impacts more on the overall economy in these countries.   
Finally, we consider whether the share of owner-occupied housing matters. With high 
owner-occupancy rates, the wealth effect of monetary policy should be important and one 
would expect a larger impact of monetary policy shocks on GDP (see Maclennan et al. 1998). 
On the other hand, landlords or institutional investors owning rental housing also will 
experience a wealth effect and the argument rests on their wealth effect being smaller than 
that for the owner occupiers. Figure 11 shows that, contrary to our hypothesis, the effect on 
real property prices is smaller if the share of owner-occupied housing is large. This can be 
the case when house owners do not regard their house as a liquid asset, or when the 
possibility of equity withdrawal does not exist. 
In sum, we find that differences in financial structure do not seem to matter much for the 
impact of monetary policy on residential property prices and the economy more broadly. 
This may be either because we miss important characteristics that influence the responses to 
monetary policy shocks, such as the structure of the pension and the tax systems, or because 
the indicators used to group countries are poor.27 It may also be that the characteristics of the 
mortgage finance system interact with each other, and that their effect can only be detected 
when they are considered jointly. For that reason we explore whether the countries where 
the criteria generally suggest a large impact of monetary policy on residential property prices 
                                                 
27  This is suggested by the fact that they vary considerably between studies. 
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and economic activity indeed show a larger reaction to monetary policy shocks.28 However, 
Figure 12 shows that the responses of residential property prices to monetary policy shocks 
do not seem to depend significantly on the criteria we investigated. A possible explanation is 
that some characteristics that make residential property prices more sensitive to monetary 
policy typically come together with other characteristics that have a partially offsetting effect. 
For instance, it may be that the ability to take a second mortgage dampens the responses of 
households in economies in which floating rate lending is prevalent. While the reaction of 
residential property prices seems not to depend strongly on the characteristics we 
investigated above, the reaction of equity prices and GDP are indeed larger and more 
persistent in countries in which we expect the monetary transmission mechanism to be 
stronger.  
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have studied the impact of monetary policy stocks on inflation, output and 
asset prices, using VARs and panel VARs estimated on quarterly data spanning 1986 to 2006. 
The analysis suggests several tentative conclusions regarding the ability of using monetary 
policy to “lean against” residential property price and stock price booms.  
First, the panel VAR results indicate that monetary policy has large and predictable effects 
on residential property prices, and that these effects are roughly coincident with its effect on 
real economic activity. More precisely, 25 basis points increase in short-term interest rates 
depresses real GDP by about 0.125%, and real residential property prices by about three 
times as much, or 0.375%, after one or two years.  
While these results suggest that monetary policy could potentially be used to slow down 
property price booms, the estimates imply that substantial interest rate increases would be 
necessary to do so and that these increases would depress real GDP considerably. For 
instance, a 250 basis point increase in interest rates would depress residential property prices 
                                                 
28  For each of the seven criteria listed in Table 2, we assigned a value of unity to those countries 
where we expected a large reaction to monetary policy shocks on the basis of this criterion. We 
then constructed an index of the expected effects of monetary policy by summing the entries for 
each country. We expect large effects of monetary policy when a country exceeds the median value 
of the index.  
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by about 3.75% and real GDP by about 1.25%. Given that episodes of property price 
upswings have generally been associated with movements in prices of 15-20%, one is led to 
conclude that the cost of using monetary policy to slow down asset-price movements in 
order to reduce threats to financial stability might be large in terms of real output. 
Of course, these estimates may well be wrong and it is possible that the impact on real 
property prices might be larger relative to real GDP than the three-to-one ratio we estimate 
here. But even if they are much larger, say five-to-one, the impact on real economic activity 
of an attempt to depress residential property prices are nevertheless likely to be pronounced.  
Second, the estimates also indicate that monetary policy shocks depress equity prices by 
about as much as they depress residential property prices. However, equity prices decline 
immediately in this case and are back to the initial level by the time residential property 
prices reach their through. As a consequence of this difference in timing, it is not possible to 
use monetary to stabilise both residential property and equity prices.   
Third, the individual-country VAR estimates are highly imprecise. This may reflect an 
inherent shortcoming of VAR analysis: with a large number of parameters the estimates are 
necessarily subject to considerable uncertainty. If so, a central bank that is persuaded that 
policy can and should be used to influence asset prices could proceed despite the evidence to 
the contrary. Another interpretation, more plausible to us and compatible with the 
arguments of Kohn (2006), is that the impact of monetary policy on asset prices is in fact 
highly uncertain, suggesting that central banks might wish to refrain from attempting to 
steer asset prices. 
Fourth, our panel VAR analysis of the different subgroups of countries indicate that while 
the effects of monetary policy on residential property prices do appear influenced by an 
economy’s financial structure, the differences are not large. It is possible that better data on 
financial structure may lead us to have to revise this conclusion. But it is also possible that 
such data will lead us to conclude that that one aspect of financial structure that seems to 
increase the economy’s sensitivity to monetary policy may be partially offset by another, 
reducing the overall differences between economies.  
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Overall, we therefore interpret our results as suggesting that the proponents of using 
monetary policy to lean against asset-price fluctuations in order to ensure financial stability 
may have been too hasty to conclude that this is a sensible strategy.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Panel unit root tests 
 Level Difference 
 LLC IPS LLC IPS 
CPI 0.20 0.30 -3.82* -6.48* 
Real GDP -0.93 -1.46 -16.25* -15.55* 
Interest rate 0.36 -0.17 -11.77* -14.29* 
Real property prices 0.80 1.31 -5.41* -7.80* 
Real equity prices -1.24 -1.56 -18.45* -22.73* 
Note: LLC is the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) test, IPS the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test. Except for 
the interest rate, where we include a constant only, the tests for the levels include a constant and a 
trend and five lags, whereas the test for the differences include a constant and four lags. The test 
statistics are distributed as N(0,1). * denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 2. Characteristics of mortgage markets 
 Interest rate 
adjustment 
(1) 
Mortgage equity 
withdrawal 
(2) 
Average loan-to-
value ratio (%) 
(3) 
Mortgage–debt-
to-GDP ratio (%) 
(4) 
Valuation 
method 
(5) 
Securiti-
sation 
(6) 
Share of owner-
occupied homes (%) 
(7) 
Australia Variable Yes 90-100 74 Market value Yes 70 
Belgium Fixed No 80-85 31 Market value No 72 
Canada Fixed Unused 70-80 43 Lending value Yes 66 
Denmark Fixed Yes 80 67 Market value No 59 
Finland Variable Yes 75-80 40 Market value No 64 
France Fixed No 80 26 Market value No 56 
Germany Fixed No 70 52 Lending value No 42 
Ireland Variable Yes 60-70 53 Market value Yes 78 
Italy Fixed No 50 15 Market value No 80 
Japan Fixed Yes 80 36 Market value No 61 
Netherlands Fixed Yes 112 111 Market value Yes 53 
Norway Variable Yes 70 63 Market value No 77 
Spain Variable Unused 80 46 Market value Yes 85 
Sweden Variable Yes 80-90 54 Market value No 61 
Switzerland Variable No 66 128 Lending value No 36 
UK Variable Yes 70 73 Market value Yes 70 
US Fixed Yes 80 69 Market value Yes 69 
Note: Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) are from Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004), columns (3), (4) and (7) are from Calza et al. (2007), with information for Norway and 
Sweden taken from Ahearne et al. (2005) and for Switzerland from CGFS (2006).  
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Figure 1. Log real house prices (1986=100) 
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Figure 2. Annual property-price growth rates for subcategories 
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Figure 3. Impulse responses to a 25 basis points interest rate shock 
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Figure 3 (cont.): Impulse responses to a 25 basis points interest rate shock 
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Figure 3 (cont.): Impulse responses to a 25 basis points interest rate shock 
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Note: Impulse responses are the bootstrapped mean response, using the approach recommended by Sims and Zha (1999). Long dashes indicate two-standard-
error, short dashes one-standard error confidence bands. Results are based on 1000 bootstrap replications. 
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Figure 4. Panel VAR 
CPI
0 5 10 15 20
-0.00100
-0.00075
-0.00050
-0.00025
0.00000
0.00025
Real GDP
0 5 10 15 20
-0.0016
-0.0012
-0.0008
-0.0004
0.0000
Interest rate
0 5 10 15 20
-0.10
0.00
0.10
0.20
Real property prices
0 5 10 15 20
-0.005
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.001
Real equity prices
0 5 10 15 20
-0.0125
-0.0075
-0.0025
0.0025
 
Note: See note to Figure 3. 
 
Figure 5. Panel VAR split with respect to mortgage rate 
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Note: See note to Figure 3. The country grouping is indicated in Table 2. 
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Figure 6. Panel VAR split with respect to mortgage equity withdrawal 
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Note: See note to Figure 3. The country grouping is indicated in Table 2. 
Figure 7. Panel VAR split with respect to loan-to-value ratio 
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Note: See note to Figure 3. The country grouping is indicated in Table 2. 
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Figure 8. Panel VAR split with respect to mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio 
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Note: See note to Figure 3. The country grouping is indicated in Table 2. 
Figure 9. Panel VAR split with respect to valuation method 
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Note: See note to Figure 3. The country grouping is indicated in Table 2. 
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Figure 10. Panel VAR split with respect to securitisation. 
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Note: See note to Figure 3. The country grouping is indicated in Table 2. 
Figure 11. Panel VAR split with respect to owner occupancy 
High owner occupancy Low owner occupancy
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Note: See note to Figure 3. The country grouping is indicated in Table 2. 
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Figure 12. Panel VAR split according to the sum of financial structure indicators 
Large effects of monetary policy expected Small effects of monetary policy expected
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Note: See note to Figure 3. Countries in the first group include Australia, Finland, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US; countries in the second group are Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Switzerland. 
 
